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Forced labour has remained a sore point in the Japan-
South Korea relationship. The 2018 South Korean 
Supreme Court verdict on the issue of compensating 
Korean workers, forced by Japanese companies to work in 
factories and mines during World War II, has revived 
war-time memories in South Korea. The situation quickly 
escalated into a “trade war” in 2019. At a time when the 
security in East Asia requires Japan and South Korea to 
work together, a historical issue remains a lingering 
challenge. This article will attempt to understand the 
nuances of Japan-South Korea reconciliation efforts, and 
how the South Korean Supreme Court ruling against the 
Japanese Companies operating in Korea has become a 
political issue in both Japan and South Korea. Further, it 
will focus on the Japanese export control measure, 
regional security issue and how Covid-19 is affecting the 
bilateral relationship. 
Keywords: Forced Labour, Trade War, Japan’s reconciliation 
efforts, Japan-South Korea Relationship 
1. Introduction 
While the COVID-19 is wrecking the economy globally and 
regionally, the Japan-South Korea trade relationship is reeling 
under colonial and political tension. The colonial past has been a 
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major source of diplomatic tension between Japan and South 
Korea. Particularly, after the 2018 verdict by the South Korean 
Supreme Court verdict ordering Mitsubishi to pay compensation 
for forced wartime labour bedevilled the relationship between two 
countries. This deeply affected the political and economic trade 
relationship. Japan’s response to the South Korean Supreme Court 
verdict, escalated the issue into “Trade War” between the two 
leading Asian economies. Further, the security relationship 
between the two also took a hit as South Korea threatened to 
withdraw from the General Security of Military Information 
Agreement (GSOMIA) and threatened to stop sharing information 
with Japan.  
After the 2nd World War, Japan denounced the imperial rule and 
adopted a pacifist policy with strict Self-Defence Force policy 
guided by Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. Moreover, the 
Cold War and the common threat perception against the 
communist bloc sidelined the question of the Japanese colonial 
past. Post the Cold War, the alliance continued but now, South 
Korea and Japan’s decision to move away from the Cold War 
construct of East Asian security is resulting in uncertainty in the 
bilateral relationship.  
With the Japanese debate to interpret Article 9 of the Japanese 
Constitution, Japan and South Korea renewing their interest in 
building a strong military force to defend their territory against 
possible threats from North Korea and China and growing 
nationalistic sentiment among the political leadership in both Japan 
and South Korea, a political imbalance in the bilateral relationship 
has risen. Moreover, Covid-19 is creating a new set of challenges to 
both countries with an economic crisis.  It is in this context that this 
article will try and understand the nuances of Japan-South Korea 
relationship from reconciliation efforts and how the South Korean 
Supreme Court ruling against the Japanese Companies operating in 
Korea has become a political issue. The article will also focus on the 
Japanese export control measure, regional security issue and how 
Covid-19 is affecting the bilateral relationship.  




2. Japan-South Korea History of Reconciliation  
The relationship between Japan and South Korea is built on a long 
history of conflict, cooperation and friendship. Despite the long 
legacy of war and other historical disputes, Korea and Japan 
developed a sustained diplomatic relation. The signing of the 
Treaty of Basic Relations in 1965 led to establishing a bilateral 
diplomatic relationship (American Society of International Law , 
1966). The normalisation treaty provided an opportunity for the 
two countries to engage positively. Economic assistance by Japan 
through five-year plans for South Korea’s economic development 
has led to a phenomenal increase in bilateral trade. Annual 
ministerial conference and an agreement to open up a new era of 
friendship and cooperation in 1983 have further contributed to the 
growth of bilateral trade. This was followed by a reconciliation 
process in 1991 to constitute a fact-finding mission on the comfort 
women. Based on the fact-finding results, Japanese Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Yohei Kono in 1993 issued an official apology to the 
victims. In the statement, he said, “The government of Japan 
extends its sincere apologies and feelings of remorse to all those, 
irrespective of place of origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and 
incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women” 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1993). In 1995, Prime Minister 
Tomiichi Murayama also issued a statement apologising for 
Japanese colonial rule and aggression in Asia.  
The colonial past has also gained prominence during bilateral 
Prime Minister Summit in 1998. During this summit, President Kim 
Dae-Jung of the ROK and Prime Minister Obuchi of Japan signed 
the historic accord “A New Japan-Republic of Korean Partnership 
towards the 21st Century.” The joint statement included Prime 
Minister Keizo Obuchi apology to South Korean President Kim Dae 
Jung for Japan occupation of Korea making it one of the important 
turning point the bilateral relationship (MOFA Japan, 1998). This 
was the first time Japan officially apologised to South Korean 
people in the joint-statement. President Kim accepted the sincerity 
of Prime Minister Obuchi’s statement and called upon two nations 
“to overcome their unfortunate history and to build a future-
oriented relationship based on reconciliation” (MOFA Japan, 1998). 





Japan and the ROK were able to put an end to the “unfortunate 
past” (MOFA Japan, 1998) for the sake of a new future. The 1998 
joint declaration illustrates the genuine efforts taken by both 
nations in overcoming the colonial past.  
The successive Japanese Prime Ministers, including Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe during his first term in 2007 endorsed an earlier 
Japanese position on the colonial issues. However, Prime Minister 
Abe aversion towards the “Comfort Women” and failure to 
acknowledge the Imperial Japanese Army colonial rule over Korea 
has raised severe concern among the Koreans about Japanese 
commitment to the reconciliation process. This coincides with 
South Korean Supreme Court ruling in 2018 on the Forced Labour 
issue exposed the weak link in the bilateral cooperation. In the 
changing geopolitical situation in the region, the Korean Supreme 
Court ruling against Japanese companies has created disconcert in 
the relationship, many experts deemed that the bilateral 
relationship has reached the historical nadir (Lee, 2013).  
3. The Forced Labour Issue: Tipping point of “Trade War” 
In 2018, the South Korean Supreme Court upheld the lower court 
verdict on October 2018, that “the right to compensation for forced 
labour is not subject to the treaty,” (New York Times, 2018) 
therefore plaintiff holds the right to compensation. Based on that, 
the top court ordered Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal Corp 
(NSSM) and Mitsubishi Industries to pay compensations to the 
complainants. The ruling against two major Japanese corporations 
has raised concern over the future of Japan-South Korea diplomatic 
relationship. Nearly, eighty Japanese companies are facing similar 
damage suit in South Korea Court. The Supreme Court ruling has 
adversely affected the economic future of these Japanese companies 
(facing similar lawsuits) in South Korea courts and poses an 
existential threat to Japanese business. Moreover, Japan views the 
Supreme Court ruling undermining the legal basis of the 
longstanding relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea 
bound by the San Francisco Peace Treaty and poses a serious 
challenge to the post-war international order as well. For years, 
Japan has emphasised on the clause [Article II of the 1965 treaty] to 




argue “that every bilateral problem pertaining to the colonial past 
has already been settled by virtue of the treaty.”1  
Under the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems concerning 
Property and Claims and on Economic Cooperation of 1965, Japan 
provided the South Korea Government with 300 million USD in 
grants and loan up to 200 million dollars, when the national budget 
of the ROK was approximately 300 million USD.2 The South 
Korean government was to be responsible for every individual 
claim from the Korean nationals. The Agreement confirmed that 
the issues concerning all the claims between the two countries are 
settled.  
The South Korea Government allocated a part of the funds to the 
workers’ bereaved families. In 2005, the administration of South 
Korea reconfirmed that the issue of such workers was covered by 
the Agreement. This formula of “once-and-for-all” settlement of 
claims was never an invention of diplomats of the two countries. 
This formula was one of the essential elements of the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty as well. It is Japan’s way of interpreting the post-war 
justice and currently with the Korean Supreme Court ruling the 
Japanese government holds that the right to seek post-war justice 
cannot be exercised in individual country courts.   
In response to assertive displeasure expressed by Japan, the South 
Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-Wha in a telephonic 
conversation in 2018 October to the Japanese Foreign Minister 
Kono said that the government “respected the judiciary’s decision 
and would develop its next steps after reviewing matters related to 
the ruling and comprehensively mulling over the full range of 
relevant factors” (MOFA Republic of Korea, 2018). Consequently, 
the South Korean government formed an inter-agency task force to 
look into Supreme Court rulings on Japanese wartime forced 
labour issues, a Foreign Ministry official said on 3rd December 2018. 
The task force is set to comprise of the foreign, justice and interior 
ministries who will scrutinise legal issues relating to the rulings 
while also taking into account South Korean public opinion and its 
ties with Japan (Hurst, 2018). 





The step taken by the South Korean government to implement the 
Supreme Court verdict further alienated Japan. Japanese Foreign 
Minister Tao Kono called the verdict “extremely regrettable and 
unacceptable”(The Korean Herald, 2018) and claimed that it 
“violates Article II of the Agreement and inflicts unjustifiable 
damage and costs on the said Japanese company.” (The Korean 
Herald, 2018) Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe told reporters 
that “the ruling is impossible in terms of international law.” 
Further, Foreign Ministry statements indicate that it is considering 
all the legal aspect of the case to take the matter to the international 
court. The South Korean Prime Minister claims that Japanese 
remarks are “aggressive,” “neither legitimate nor wise” (The 
Korean Times, 2018). In response, South Korea accused Japan of 
politicising the issue. Its foreign ministry said in a statement that 
South Korea was “very concerned that Japan’s leaders in positions 
of responsibility are disregarding the root cause of the issue and 
continue to make comments that rouse our public’s emotions” (Lee, 
2018). The South Korean Foreign Ministry statement in November 
2018 states “the Japanese government must be aware that excessive 
political emphasis on the present case will be of no help to the 
future-oriented relationship between South Korea and Japan”(Lee, 
2018).  
4. Diplomatic Fallout Leading to ‘Trade War’  
The Japanese media was seen covering the issue with an overtly 
outraged warning.  Experts’ fear that if the political rhetoric 
continues it will jeopardise the business of the Japanese companies 
operating in South Korea over the compensation and could 
ultimately lead to the companies pulling out of South Korea. But 
South Korea was also responding with strong statements. Ruling 
Democratic Party’s spokesman Hong Ihk-Pyo, has called for an 
apology and compensation not only from the companies but also 
from the Government of Japan. The main opposition, Liberty Korea 
Party also issued a strong statement condemning Japan for 
disrespecting the feelings of Koreans and sought a sincere apology 
from the Japanese government over forced labour and comfort 
women issue (Denver.S, 2018). In these circumstances of brewing 




political hatred and domestic public anger, President Moon Jae's 
used caution so as not to incite antagonistic emotions between the 
people of both the countries. The political fallout has been visible at 
the 26th Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic 
Leadership Meeting where both Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe and South Korean President Moon Jae-in skipped bilateral 
talks on side-line of APEC summit in Papua New Guinea. The duo 
also did not meet during G20 meeting held at Argentina as well.    
Moreover, the South Korean Government’s decision to close down 
“Reconciliation and Healing Foundation” established as a part of 
Japan-South Korea agreement in 2015 to support the former sex 
slave is a major setback for Japan-South Korea diplomatic initiative. 
As the fallout of political tension between Japan-South Korea has a 
serious repercussion on business activity between the two nations, 
the Japanese and South Korean chamber of commerce had 
postponed their annual meeting. The Japanese decision to file a 
complaint against South Korean the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) over shipbuilding subsidy issue has been seen as the result 
of Seoul’s decision on forced labour issue (Bej & Panneerselvam, 
2019). In a renewed display of tension, the Japanese government on 
December 2018 released video footage of a South Korean naval ship 
locking its fire-control radar on a Japan Maritime Self-Defence 
patrol plane. 
In case of a diplomatic deadlock between Japan and South Korea, 
Tokyo has hinted on taking the issue to the ICJ. Citing the ICJ 
ruling on Germany vs Italy over state immunity, Japan has used 
the issue to seek protection for a state from being sued in the courts 
of other states, as a precedent for wartime forced labour lawsuits. 
However, it is important to note that the concept of state immunity 
does not apply to cases involving individuals and corporations 
(Law Library of Congress, 2008). The ICJ has jurisdiction only to 
deal with legal disputes between states. Hence, Japan cannot seek a 
non-binding advisory opinion from the ICJ without South Korea’s 
involvement.  
The two landmark judgement from Constitutional Court and the 
Supreme Court of Korea followed by Korean Government’s 
assertive stance on the two historical issues – Comfort Women and 





Forced Labour issues has deepened the mistrust between the two 
nations. On the other hand, the domestic political environment is 
undergoing a major political shift with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
emerging as a dominant leader. Prime Minister Abe also suggested 
taking a more assertive policy vis-a-vee with South Korea. Experts 
say that the rise of nationalism and insensitive comments by 
Japanese ruling party members has escalated the tension between 
Japan and South Korea. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s nationalist 
views have infuriated neighbours reminding them of the Japanese 
military aggression of the past. Moreover, his vision of reforming 
the constitution by strengthening the role of the military is also 
viewed with suspicion by several business partners and Asian 
neighbours. The Japanese Government’s recent policy 
transformation and an assertive stance towards South Korea over 
the issue of Forced Labour issue spiralled into a trade war with 
South Korea.  
 5. “Weaponisation of Trade” – Japan Embargo on ROK 
The South Korea Government’s handling of forced labour and 
Comfort Women issues has escalated the issue into a trade war 
between two important major democracies in East Asia. Japan 
imposed an export controls mechanism in July 2019 targeting three 
essential chemicals used in products produced by South Korean 
tech giants - Samsung and LG as a response to South Korean 
Supreme Court ruling on the Japanese Companies. Even though 
Tokyo said the move was due to a “loss of trust” in relations with 
Seoul, the control imposition has been further securitised when 
Japan accused South Korea of improperly handling exports of 
sensitive materials from Japan (DW, 2020).  This has brought South 
Korea’s management of re-export controls and the military dual-
use applications of the chemicals under the scanner.  
The materials on which the export control has been put in place are 
fluorinated polyimides, photoresists and hydrogen fluoride. While 
fluorinated polyimides are used in smartphone displays, the 
photoresists are thin layers of material used to transfer circuit 
patterns onto semiconductor wafers and hydrogen fluoride is used 
as an etching gas in the chip-making process. Japan produces about 




more than 80 per cent of the world’s fluorinated polyimides and 
photoresists (Panneerselvam & Bej, 2019). This indicates that 
without these raw materials, the manufacturing of the chip and 
other smartphone components are impossible for Samsung or LG. 
The economy in South Korea is technology dependent hence 
stopping the supply of key components for the production of 
smartphones indicates that beyond tariff and other fiscal policies, it 
is the technological resources (raw materials) that determine the 
economics and politics between two countries.  
After Japan stripped the ‘white list’ status from South Korea under 
a trade control law, Tokyo is now in a position to seek a licence for 
items that the country feels could have weapons-related 
applications. This prompted South Korea not to renew a military 
intelligence-sharing pact (DW, 2019).Tokyo has based the export 
control over a technical leeway in the WTO rules of national 
security. It has claimed that some of the chemicals are finding its 
way into North Korea.  In June 2020, Japan also launched an anti-
dumping probe into the import of a chemical compound called 
potassium carbonate used in the production of glass of liquid 
crystal panel (Nikkei Asia, 2020). Japan also threatened to impose 
more regressive sanction measures on South Korea products. Japan 
trade restriction led to a concern in South Korea over its capability 
to produce the goods without Japanese support.  
6. Trade War: Impact on Japan and South Korean Economy  
Japan and South Korea are facing an economic crisis since the 2008 
financial crisis as the Covid-19 weighed on consumer demand and 
export. Trony Stangarone, Senior Director at the Korean Economic 
Institute of America says that the trade war had a minor impact on 
the trade relationship between Japan and South Korea (Stangarone, 
2020). But, what is damaging about the trade war is the 
technological aspect of that. Japan’s policy to regulate the export of 
chemical components need to manufacture the semiconductors to 
South Korea has greatly affected Korean manufacturing sectors.  In 
2018, semiconductor sales accounted for almost 92 per cent of 
South Korea’s export growth which has made South Korea the 
technological monopoly of telecommunication parts 





(Panneerselvam & Bej, 2019). The trade dispute has systematically 
affected the semiconductor prices thereby slowing down Korean 
exports. Samsung and Hynix together supply 70 per cent of DRAM 
chips worldwide and 50 per cent of NAND flash memory chips 
(Lee H. , 2019). With low export volumes and the shortage of 
materials to make semiconductors the component of the global 
handset is set to see a price rise that will impact the global supply 
and demand chain as well. This has pushed South Korea to rethink 
its supply chains and look for other avenues like Israel.  
The present economic policy has alarmed many corporate houses 
and signals to a possible economic slowdown on manufacturing 
and supplying of smartphones but it has been largely supported by 
Japan’s conservative administration. This is the first time Japan has 
responded in action to South Korea. However, the export control 
policy by Japan will not fare well economically even though it fares 
well politically for Japan. In an interview to the South China 
Morning Post, Yoichi Shimada of Fukui Prefectural University said, 
‘the conservative supporters of Shinzo Abe have for some time 
been demanding a strong bilateral response to South Korea’s 
handling of the forced labour issue’ and the nose tightening of the 
tech raw materials is political appeasement of the domestic support 
base that is hitting South Korea’s economy ‘exactly where it pains’ 
(South China Morning Post, 2019). In response, South Korea has 
begun producing Etching Gas domestically. In September 2019, 
Samsung Electronics has announced that it will use domestically 
produced etching gas in its chip-making process to evade its 
dependence on Japanese suppliers. This localised production by 
Seoul came in August when the government proposed a budget 
increase of 17.3 per cent for research and development for the next 
year to ‘strengthen the indigenous production in the material 
sector’ (FT, 2019). With South Korea as the largest buyer of tech 
chemicals from Japan, pushing Seoul to look outside or inward will 
tilt Japan’s export pattern as well. Just like South Korea, Japan 
might also experience a hit for the demand of its products. At 
present, the Japanese products are preferred for their high quality 
but it could be replaced by US-or Chinese-made components. This 
might make companies restrict exports for an extended period. 
With an interdependent economy, the dispute between Japan and 




South Korea is a stark reminder of what monopolisation of a 
resource for a long time can lead to.  
7. Regional Security in the Korean Peninsula: A Tense 
Japan-ROK relationship  
The heightened discord between Japan and South Korea was vivid 
at the Trilateral Summit in the city of Chengdu on 24 December 
2019. Prime Minister Abe took a tough stand against South Korea 
and urged its counterpart to come up with measures to resolve 
bilateral disputes. Even though the two leaders along with China 
discussed North Korea, amid concerns of Pyongyang planning a 
missile test in case of the US not making an exception in nuclear 
talks; the meeting aptly represented the current geopolitical 
situation of soured relations between the two main players in the 
Korean peninsula: Japan and South Korea.    
As economic, social and political relation between Japan and South 
Korea continues to deteriorate this year, the repercussions of the 
same were felt in their security relations as well. The security 
relations between the two countries is further dependent on the 
changing regional dynamics especially with how each country 
responds to the missile threats and nuclear weaponisation by North 
Korea and the presence of the US and China in the region. Thus on 
22 August 2019, when South Korea announced that it would not be 
renewing the bilateral General Security of Military Information 
Agreement (GSOMIA), it presented a blow to the US-Japan–South 
Korea trilateral security cooperation vis-a-vis North Korea. South 
Korea and Japan have endured seven decades of profound distrust 
but still had been able to maintain a commonality in their vision on 
regional security. 
The pause in the nuclear talks between North Korea and the US has 
further added to the difference in approach between Japan and 
South Korea in dealing with the Korean crisis. While President 
Moon continues to broker peace between the US and North Korea, 
Prime Minister Abe echoed a strong criticism against North Korean 
missile launches as violating the UN resolutions and threatening 
regional security. President Moon took up the challenge of bringing 





about an inter-Korean rapprochement as his legacy. But for Prime 
Minister Abe the ‘issue of Japanese abductees took precedence over 
the North Korean nuclear threat and Japan has maintained this 
stance towards Pyongyang ever since.  
As external regional dynamics dictate the security relations 
between Japan and South Korea, it was intense pressure from the 
United States that led South Korea to reverse itself on 22 November 
and extend an intelligence-sharing pact with Japan, a move that the 
Seoul government wanted to halt (New York Times, 2018). The 
decision to remain in the intelligence pact, which South Korea had 
vowed to abandon just three months ago, appeared to be a short-
term victory for the US but it further increased the reluctance to 
mend relations (Choe, Motoko, & Wong, 2019). Japan has 
preserved the pact but has also remained upset over an impasse 
with South Korea in a separate dispute which has cost the country 
its economic, historical and diplomatic standing.  
From the perspective of South Korea, its decision to renew the pact 
came as Japan announced that it would resume negotiations with 
South Korea over export controls. Current and former American 
officials familiar with the intelligence-sharing agreement said its 
implementation was still in the early stages (Choe, Motoko, & 
Wong, 2019). Experts claim that “once the infrastructure and 
protocols are in place to make the agreement work, the two nations, 
in theory, would be able to coordinate on intelligence on critical 
security matters in Asia. Without the agreement, both nations need 
the American military to act as a go-between for coordinating on 
intelligence”(Choe, Motoko, & Wong, 2019). However, with the 
distrust between the two countries growing, it remains to be seen 
how far the two countries will walk independently in coordinating 
in security matters. The prospects of de-escalating tensions at the 
government level while both President Moon and Prime Minister 
Abe remain in office have dimmed. With the US unwilling to play a 
role in the East Asian security architecture that both Tokyo and 
Seoul have come to expect in the past, there is no obvious respite in 
the current imbroglio.  
Captain Sukjoon Yoon, a Senior Fellow at the Korean Institute for 
Military Affairs says, it is important for two nations to 




acknowledge the security and similar geopolitical interest. This 
provides an opportunity to deepen military-to-military cooperation 
(Yoon, 2019). Despite South Korea and Japan being the two largest 
liberal democracies in East Asia, the trade, economic and technical 
cooperation has failed to strengthen the strategic-military relations. 
Captain Yoon claims, “the military cooperation has always been 
very limited, and is generally mediated through their separate 
relationships with the US military.” The naval faceoff in 2018 
December in between Republic of Korea Navy Destroyer and Japan 
Maritime Self-Defence Force patrol aircraft is a clear indication of 
the deep distrust between two militaries (MoD Japan, 2019).  
There are several reasons as to why it is in the interest of Japan and 
South Korea to work towards a recalibration of their military 
relation. First, the security in the Korean Peninsula has been more 
than tense after an abrupt ending in the denuclearisation talks 
between the US and North Korea. Both countries have 
individualistic stakes in maintaining peace in the peninsula. Hence 
this gives a position of finding a common ground despite the 
different approaches of both Japan and South Korea in tackling the 
issue. Second would be the changing nature of security threat in 
Northeast Asia The North Korean nuclear and missile threat 
against South Korea, Japan and the US military base in the region is 
imminent. During the party foundation day military parade in 
Pyongyang, North Korea displayed new ICBM for the first time to 
be designated as part of Hwasong – 15 series. The ICBM is 
reportedly to have a maximum range of 15, 000 kilometres 
challenging the US and Japanese position in the Pacific Ocean. 
Moreover, the increasing threat from China and Russia is a major 
concern for regional security. The Chinese and Russian long-range 
patrol aircraft incursions into South Korean and Japanese airspace 
has increased in recent times. In 2018, Air Self-Defence Force 
(ASDF) aircraft scrambled 999 times in response to Chinese and 
Russian aircraft (MoD Japan, 2019). Chinese is steadily increasing 
its naval activity in the East China Sea and South China remains a 
concern for the US and its ally Japan and South Korea.  
This changing nature of threats in the region has led both the 
countries to take a separate defence posture and find alliances 





outside of the region and the US. In 2018, the defence budget of 
South Korea increased by 7 per cent. In 2019, the budget grew by 
8.2 per cent. According to the Midterm Defense Plan for 2020-2024, 
the administration’s budget for force improvement programs of 
103.8 trillion was utilised in funding the acquisition and 
development of military capabilities (Glosserman & Choi, 2019). 
However another important development to note is that South 
Korea’s threat perception of today doesn’t just arise from the 
Korean peninsula but also the West, China and Japan. The 
emerging geopolitical situation in the region and balance of power 
between the US and China is also an important factor to 
understand the present discontent between Japan and South Korea. 
South Korea has chiefly oscillated between maritime powers like 
Japan and a continental threat like North Korea. These varying 
strategic and security calculation is the result of a great power 
competition between the US and China (Matsuda & Park, 2019).  
During the Cold War, the Korean peninsula was the epicentre of 
global politics. Japan and South Korea have oriented their security 
and military priority to safeguard their interest against Soviet 
Russia, China and North Korean nuclear threats. Since the end of 
the Cold War, the rise of China as a dominant power, the security 
architecture of the region has changed as well as the strategic 
priority of Japan and South Korea is also adjusting to the existing 
security environment. In the new geopolitical reality, there are two 
primary factors to consider: First, China’s rise as a naval power and 
assertive maritime policy to change the regional broader in the 
region. Chinese building artificial islands in the South China Sea 
and stepped up the military activities in East China has a major 
implication for Japan, which immensely depend upon sea-line of 
communication for energy import and trade. On the other hand, 
South Korea economy growing close to the Chinese economy is 
looking at an alternative approach to Korean unification and 
managing nuclear threats from the North Korean regime. At the 
same time, South Korea maintains strong military-to-military ties 
with the US and alliance with Japan.  
Second, the US supremacy in the region was constantly challenged 
by the Chinese military in the region. On the other hand, Japan’s 




increasing awareness of itself as “a maritime state,” as underscored 
in Japan’s first National Security Strategy in 2013, (PMO Japan, 
2013) has not only led the country to expand its naval capability but 
has also deepened its security ties with other like-minded nations, 
such as Australia and India (Harold & Derek Grossman, 2019). It is 
against this background that the country has moved to adopt and 
balance an independent military posture. Hence, each policy of the 
current President Moon Jae-in is aimed to build a nation that is not 
broken or shaken. President Moon has underscored the importance 
of “autonomous defence” (Harold & Derek Grossman, 2019)— the 
ability of South Korea to defend itself without foreign support — to 
achieve national sovereignty and strategic independence. His 
policy towards a Korean unification is aimed at building a strong 
and self-reliant nation and coupled with it is his announcement in 
2018 for an 8.2 per cent increase in the defence budget for 2019, the 
largest such increase in a decade. On the other hand, Japan’s 
difficult ties with China have led it to maintain a balanced 
approach with the US. While the geopolitical dynamics remain in 
flux, Japan and South Korea’s tensions add to the crisis and will 
continue to remain tense.   
8. Japan and South Korea Relationship: Post-Covid-19 and 
Way Forward.  
The Covid-19 has deeply affected Japan and the South Korean 
economy. The postponement of the Tokyo Olympic game and 
worsening domestic economic crisis in Japan, as well as a decrease 
in global demand for consumables goods due to Covid-19, pose a 
serious economic and trade challenge for both countries. Moreover, 
the sudden resignation of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in September 
and appointment of Mr Yoshihide Suga as a new Prime Minister of 
Japan is facing numerous challenges including Covid-19, 
stagnating economy ahead of the Tokyo 2021 Olympic and most 
importantly the mending relationship with South Korea. After 
assuming the office, Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga spoke with 
South Korean President Moon Jae-in over the phone. Speaking to 
news reporters, Prime Minister Suga said that Japan will not soften 
its stand under his leadership, at the same time he mentioned “that 





work together on various issues, including on the coronavirus, and 
I believe the Japan-South Korea and the Japan-U.S.-South Korean 
alliances are important to resolving issues such as North Korea” 
(Japan Times, 2020). The telephonic conversation led to opening up 
communication between Japan and South Korea. Two sides also 
agreed for regular consultation to improve the ties. As a first step, 
both countries have agreed to (Korea JoongAng Daily, 2020)resume 
the business travel to restart the commerce ties. In November 2020, 
South Korea’s National Intelligence Director Park Jie-won met 
Prime Minister Sauga to discuss bilateral issues including the 
North Korean nuclear and missile threat (Korea JoongAng Daily, 
2020).The two sides stressed the need for cooperation with the US 
to make the alliance system work in East Asia. The President-elect 
Joe Biden also called both Japanese and South Korean leadership 
and assured commitment in the matter of regional security (South 
China Morning Post, 2020). Amid Covid-19, Japan and South Korea 
have decided to move forward with the normalisation process 
which had been affected by the Forced Labour issue and trade 
embargo imposed by Japan. But this time, more than the 
normalisation of the trade relationship, both Japan and South 
Korea are faced with a serious challenge of solving the question of 
colonial issues.  
9. Conclusion 
The Trade War mooted deep mistrust in the bilateral relationship 
between the two countries. South Korean tech industries have 
begun looking for domestic suppliers to replace Japanese products. 
The South Korean government has promised to invest in domestic 
production of semiconductors material. As a result of the Japanese 
export control measure, Japanese companies and products are 
facing backlash in South Korea showing declining growth trend in 
2019. Both Japan and South Korean leadership have agreed to 
resolve the trade conflict through dialogue. As the security of East 
Asia hinges on the Japan and South Korea security cooperation, 
Japan and South Korea need to work together in finding a final 
solution to the historical issues like forced labour and comfort 




women issues, which has been the main source of tension in the 
diplomatic relationship.  
                                                          
1 Failure of the Republic of Korea to comply with obligations regarding 
arbitration under the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems 
concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Co-operation 
between Japan and the Republic of Korea, MOFA Japan, 
https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002553.html  
2 Ibid  
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